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Abstract
When expanding abroad, a multinational bank faces a trade-o¤ between accessing a
foreign country via cross border lending or a nancial foreign direct investment, i.e. green-
eld or acquisition entry. We analyze the entry mode choice of multinational banks and
explicitly derive the entry mode pattern in the banking industry. Moreover, we show that
in less developed banking markets, a trend towards cross border lending and acquisition
entry exists. Greeneld entry prevails in more developed markets. Furthermore, we iden-
tify a tendency towards acquisition entry in small and towards greeneld entry in larger
host countries.
JEL classication: F37, G21, G34, L13, O16
Keywords: foreign bank entry, multinational bank, cross border lending, greeneld entry,
acquisition entry
1 Introduction
The last few years have seen an impressive liberalization of banking markets. While banks
active in rather saturated developed nancial markets looked for new investment and growth
opportunities, banks in many emerging economies were in need for fresh capital in the aftermath
of banking crises. The privatization process in Eastern Europe provided further opportunities
for multinational banks to expand abroad. Nowadays, in around 40 percent of all developing
countries, more than 50 percent of banks are foreign owned. Strikingly, this gure rises to more
than 80 percent in several Eastern European countries (Claessens et al., 2008).
This immense transformation of banking markets triggers several questions concerning both
the incentives of multinational banks to enter new markets and the incentives of host countries
as how to shape foreign entry. Should a multinational bank grant cross border loans or rather
access a new market via de novo investment or the acquisition of a local bank? How do the
development and the size of the local banking market a¤ect a multinational banks entry mode
choice? What are the host country policy makers preferences regarding di¤erent entry modes
of foreign banks?
With the aim to address these questions, we set up a model of spatial bank competition à la
Salop. Foreign banks may enter the host country via cross border lending, de novo investment
or the acquisition of a domestic bank. Banks compete in interest rates for potential borrowers
that engage in investment projects of uncertain return. Foreign banks have access to a better
screening technology and enjoy lower renancing costs than local banks. However, besides
market entry costs, foreign banks are at a disadvantage relative to domestic banks in that
the latter hold soft information on borrowers due to prior lending relationships. Furthermore,
granting cross border loans implies a rather limited knowledge of the host market. Hence, when
multinational banks decide about their mode of entry, they face a trade-o¤ between the size of
market entry costs and their relative disadvantage in what concerns access to soft information
and their knowledge of the local market.
We demonstrate that multinational banks choose their entry mode according to their e¢ -
ciency in screening potential borrowers. If a bank is rather ine¢ cient in screening, it chooses not
to expand abroad. With increasing e¢ ciency, cross border lending becomes feasible. As soon
as the better market knowledge in case of greeneld entry compared to cross border lending
compensates for the larger xed entry cost, the foreign bank shifts from cross border lending to
de novo investment. Only if the screening technology of the foreign bank is powerful enough, it
can drive down the acquisition price to the point that acquisition entry becomes the dominant
entry mode.
A major focus of our study is to explain how a foreign banks entry mode choice is a¤ected
by the nancial development and the size of the host banking market. Indicators for the
host countrys level of nancial development in our model are the screening e¢ ciency and
renancing conditions of local relative to foreign banks. As a further indicator serves the
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importance of access to soft information as a measure of a markets transparency. A high level
of competitive pressure is yet another sign for increased development. We show that in less
developed host banking markets a wider range of foreign banks opt for cross border lending and
acquisition entry whereas the range of foreign banks that prefer greeneld investment contracts.
Interestingly, a wider range of foreign banks favors acquisition entry in smaller host banking
markets whereas the attractiveness of de novo investment is enhanced in larger markets.
Our welfare analysis allows us to determine the preferences of the host country policy maker
concerning foreign bank entry. The policy maker prefers a foreign bank not to enter the market
when it is rather ine¢ cient in screening borrowers. From the policy makers point of view, cross
border lending is strictly dominated by greeneld entry. Greeneld entry, in turn, is favored
for intermediate screening e¢ ciencies of foreign banks. If a foreign bank is highly e¢ cient
in screening borrowers, the policy maker prefers the foreign bank to acquire a local bank.
Although the policy makers preferences regarding foreign entry are similar to those of foreign
banks, scope for regulation exists as the threshold values determining the preferred entry mode
pattern of the policy maker and the foreign banks di¤er.
We nd that the regulation of foreign bank entry is shaped as follows. Entry is permitted
but to foreign banks that rather e¢ ciently screen borrowers. Furthermore, the less competitive
the market environment is, the more likely it is that foreign banks are denied entry. Cross
border lending is not allowed for. Foreign banks that intend to expand via cross border lending
or the acquisition of a local bank are forced to enter via de novo investment if their screening
e¢ ciency is insu¢ ciently low.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature.
Section 3 describes the set-up of the model. In section 4, we study the entry mode choice of
multinational banks. Comparative statics in section 5 allow us to analyze the impact of the
nancial development as well as the size of the host banking market on the entry mode decision
of foreign banks. We present the welfare analysis in section 6. Empirical hypotheses are stated
in section 7. Section 8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The massive expansion of multinational banks into emerging markets and transition countries
over the last years has spurred the analysis of how host banking markets are a¤ected by the
entry of foreign banks. For instance, Martínez Pería and Mody (2004) empirically analyze
the impact of foreign bank entry on the e¢ ciency of host banking markets. They nd lower
interest rate spreads of foreign relative to domestic banks and that increased foreign bank
participation decreases overall costs in the banking sector. The inuence of foreign bank entry
on credit stability is addressed by de Haas and van Lelyveld (2006). Their study implies that
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the credit supply of foreign banks remains stable during crisis periods in the host country
but that this e¤ect is mainly driven by greeneld foreign banks. DellAriccia and Marquez
(2004) point to the trade-o¤ between superior information of host country banks and lower
renancing costs of foreign banks entering the market. Sengupta (2007) incorporates this trade-
o¤ into a theoretical model in order to nd out which market segment foreign banks serve. His
analysis shows that foreign banks tend to serve large rms while domestic banks lend to riskier
market segments. He concludes that stronger legal protection can overcome informational
barriers of foreign banks and, in turn, facilitate entry. Claeys and Hainz (2006) analyze the
impact of foreign entry on competition in the host country. In line with Sengupta (2007) they
assume that foreign banks have a cost advantage, though here in the form of a better screening
technology, whereas domestic banks have an informational advantage concerning old borrowers.
In contrast to Sengupta (2007), they distinguish between two forms of market entry, greeneld
investment and acquisition. It follows from their analysis that the mode of entry determines
the information distribution between foreign and domestic banks which, in turn, a¤ects the
degree of competition. Claeys and Hainz (2006) conclude that greeneld investment leads to
more competition in the host country than acquisition.
Our model builds on similar assumptions as DellAriccia and Marquez (2004), Sengupta
(2007), and Claeys and Hainz (2006) in that we also assume an informational advantage of
domestic banks and superior screening skills of foreign banks. However, we do not focus on
how foreign entry a¤ects the host banking market but on how foreign banks decide to expand
abroad. Although the impact of foreign entry on host banking markets has been studied quite
extensively, the expansion of multinational banks and, even more so, their entry mode choice
has received astonishingly little attention in the nance literature so far. Our aim is to ll this
void. In contrast to Sengupta (2007) and Claeys and Hainz (2006) we explicitly derive under
which conditions a multinational bank expands via cross border lending, greeneld investment
or acquisition. Our analysis sets in one step before Sengupta (2007). We do not analyze how
entry of foreign banks can be facilitated but whether and in which form the policy maker of the
host country wants entry to take place. This allows us to derive some implications concerning
the regulation of foreign bank entry.
In that we account for a full range of possible entry modes of foreign banks, our paper adds
to the so far relatively scarce literature on how foreign banks decide about their entry mode.
Buch and Lipponer (2007) and García Herrero and Martínez Pería (2007) empirically analyze
the decision of multinational banks to expand abroad via cross border lending or via a nancial
foreign direct investment but do not explicitly distinguish between greeneld investment and
acquisition. They nd that the larger the host banking market, the more a foreign direct
investment is preferred over cross border activities. Van Tassel and Vishwasrao (2007) as well as
Beermann (2007) set up models to study the trade-o¤ between greeneld and acquisition entry.
Van Tassel and Vishwasrao conclude that a multinational bank generally favors acquisition
over de novo entry. Beermann shows that the most e¢ cient banks choose to expand via the
acquisition of a host country bank whereas less e¢ cient banks opt for greeneld entry.
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Our paper is further related to two strands of literature, namely trade theory and industrial
organization literature. Trade theory explains a rms decision to expand abroad via exports
(the equivalent to cross border lending) or a foreign direct investment (the equivalent to a
nancial foreign direct investment). One of the rst models in trade theory to study the export
versus foreign direct investment decision of rms is Brainard (1993). She points to the trade-o¤
between xed and variable costs. Firms choose to export in case of high xed and low variable
costs and to serve the foreign market via a foreign direct investment otherwise. Helpman,
Melitz and Yeaple (2004) incorporate rm heterogeneity into this trade-o¤ between variable
and xed costs. They show that when countries open up to trade, the least productive rms
are forced to exit the market and the remaining rms engage with increasing labor productivity
in exports before they start to operate in a new market via a foreign direct investment. Nocke
and Yeaple (2004) theoretically analyze the decision of a rm to expand via de novo investment
or the acquisition of a local rm and conclude that the most e¢ cient rms opt for de novo
investment. In a related paper, Nocke and Yeaple (2007) distinguish between exports, greeneld
and acquisition entry and suggest that the entry mode choice of rms depends on whether
foreign and host country rms di¤er in mobile or immobile capabilities.
Related articles in the industrial organization literature focus on the trade-o¤ between
greeneld and acquisition entry. Gilroy and Lukas (2006), Görg (2000), Iranzo (2003), as well
as Ra¤ et al. (2006) set up models in which a rms decision between greeneld and acquisition
entry depends on di¤erences in the marginal costs of foreign and domestic rms. As in Eicher
and Kang (2005) or Müller (2007), it is generally assumed that a greeneld entrant produces
at lower marginal costs than domestic rms. This is motivated by the foreign rms superior
production technology of which it can take full advantage when building its own production
facilities from scratch. At the same time, however, this implies huge xed market entry costs.
In contrast, if entry occurs via acquisition, the foreign rm is presumed to be constrained to
the use of the inferior production facilities of the acquired rm and, in addition, the need to
restructure the target rm. In turn, this implies higher marginal costs of the foreign compared
to the domestic rm. Most of these papers conclude that rather productive rms opt for de
novo investment whereas less productive rms favor the acquisition of a domestic rm.
The situation in the banking industry is di¤erent. A multinational bank that enters a new
market via de novo investment faces a disadvantage relative to domestic banks in that the latter
hold soft information on borrowers due to prior lending relationships. Consequently, when a
foreign bank opts for greeneld entry, it may incur higher variable costs than the domestic
banks. However, if a multinational bank decides to enter a new market via the acquisition of
a host country bank, it gains access to the soft information held by the target. Moreover, the
entrant can relatively easily implement its own superior screening technology. As a result, the
entrant may operate at lower marginal costs than domestic banks.
Hence, we add to the trade and industrial organization literature with its focus on manufac-
turing industries in that we account for special characteristics of the banking sector. We depart
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from trade theory in that our model is not based on monopolistic competition. Rather, banks
in our model compete in prices which we consider a more appropriate form of competition in
the banking industry. Furthermore, instead of labor productivity we rely on a banks screening
e¢ ciency as the key indicator of its productivity since it determines the quality of its credit
portfolio. Moreover, we add to the industrial organization literature in that we stress that
the foreign bankslack of access to soft information may imply the reversal of the pattern of
marginal costs as described above. As in the industrial organization literature, we allow for
restructuring costs but emphasize that they should be of a rather xed nature.
3 The Model
We consider two separated banking markets, A and B. Multinational banks are based in market
A. Market B represents the host banking market. In market B, a continuum of borrowers with
mass m is uniformly distributed along a circular road with circumference 1. Each borrower
can engage in one investment project that requires an initial outlay of 1. Borrowers can either
invest in good or in bad projects. It is common knowledge that the fraction of borrowers with
good projects is  and the fraction of borrowers with bad projects is 1 , 0 <  < 1. Individual
borrowers know about the quality of their own investment projects. In case the project is good
it generates a return v > 0 with certainty while a bad project always fails yielding a return of
zero. The returns of the projects are observable and contractible. Borrowers are not endowed
with any initial wealth and therefore need to apply for credit at the banks, the only source of
nance in our model.
Before market B is opened up to the entry of a foreign bank, two identical representative
banks Bj, j = 1; 2, are located equidistantly along the circular road. The location of a bank
reects its specialization in a certain credit product or industry. Banks compete in the interest
rates rBj they simultaneously charge borrowers. Borrowers whose investment project yields
a return of v repay their loan with interest to the bank whereas borrowers whose project
fails do not repay their loan. Host country banks incur renancing costs iB > 0 per loan
of size 1. They have access to an imperfect screening technology based on the evaluation of
hard information provided by borrowers. It allows the local banks to identify the fraction B,
0 < B < 1, of borrowers investing in bad projects. The banks cannot distinguish between the
remaining borrowers with bad projects and borrowers investing in good projects. Hence, the
fraction (1  B) of bad borrowers and all good borrowers applying for credit obtain nancing.
Without loss of generality, we assume that screening is costless for all banks.
When the host banking market opens up to foreign bank entry, a foreign bank based in
market A is granted the permission to enter market B. Without loss of generality we abstract
from relocation costs and assume that after foreign entry, banks are located equidistantly along
the circular road. We assume that the foreign bank has access to a superior screening technology
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relative to domestic banks. Its screening technique allows the foreign bank to identify a fraction
A, 0 < B < A < 1, of borrowers investing in bad projects. Furthermore, we assume lower
renancing costs of foreign banks compared to host country banks, i.e. 0 < iA < iB.1 The
foreign bank may enter marketB via cross border lending, de novo investment, or the acquisition
of a domestic bank.
When a foreign bank enters the host country via cross border lending or de novo investment,
it encounters a disadvantage relative to domestic banks in what concerns the access to soft
information about borrowers. In contrast to hard information, soft information needs to be
collected over time through relationships with clients (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Stein, 2002).
As in Sengupta (2007), we assume that domestic banks were able to collect unobservable, i.e.
soft information on their borrowers during past lending relationships. In the literature, there are
di¤erent approaches to capture the soft information advantage of domestic relative to foreign
banks. DellAriccia et al. (1999) and DellAriccia (2001) base their model on the existence of
new and old borrowers so that domestic banks have an advantage over foreign banks concerning
the share of old borrowers. Gormley (2008) interprets the information advantage of domestic
versus foreign banks as higher per borrower screening costs of the latter. For our analysis, it is
convenient to model the lack of soft information about borrowers as a decline in the power of
the foreign banks screening technology. We assume that in case of cross border lending and
greeneld entry, the quality of the foreign banks screening technology is diminished by a factor
, 0 <  < 1. Hence, only the share A of borrowers with bad projects is identied. However,
the acquisition of a local bank ensures access to the soft information held by the target which
implies that the fraction A of borrowers with bad projects is denied credit. We assume that
all borrowers apply for a loan with new investment projects. Hence, although domestic banks
have access to soft information about potential clients, both foreign and domestic banks need
to screen borrowers.
In our model, we also consider the foreign banks fairly limited knowledge of the host
banking market if it grants cross border loans and, accordingly, has no large presence in the
local banking market. We capture this limited market knowledge by an even lower quality of
the foreign banks screening technology. That is, only the share A, 0 <  < 1, of borrowers
investing in bad projects is identied in case of cross border lending.2
When the foreign bank starts to operate in market B, it incurs market entry costs. Entry
costs are modeled as a xed component in case of cross border lending, FCBL, and greeneld en-
try, FGR, FCBL < FGR. Note that in case of greeneld entry the foreign bank needs to establish
a new branch network, whereas with cross border lending, it may only set up a representative
1These assumptions are conrmed by e.g. Berger (2007), Gormley (2008), and Sengupta (2007).
2Note that in case of cross border lending and greeneld entry either the foreign bank or the domestic bank
may be better in identifying borrowers with bad projects, depending on the foreign banks market knowledge 
and the extent of soft information problems . In case of acquisition entry, however, the foreign bank is always
better in screening borrowers than the domestic bank since the foreign bank has access to the soft information
held by the target.
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o¢ ce which is much less costly. When a multinational bank enters a new market via the ac-
quisition of a domestic bank, the foreign banks entry cost consists of the endogenous takeover
price PAC and a xed component FAC , with FGR < PAC + FAC . The xed component may
reect, for instance, restructuring costs or the amortization of bad credits due to asymmetric
information concerning the quality of the targets credit portfolio before the acquisition.3
Banks compete in the interest rates rA and rBj they simultaneously ask from borrowers.
Borrowers base their decision at which bank to apply for credit on the interest rates o¤ered by
the banks and the transport costs they have to incur to travel to the bank. The transport costs
express the preferences borrowers have for a particular type of bank. We assume that transport
costs tx are proportional to the distance x between the borrower and the bank. Furthermore, we
assume that the return of a good project v is high enough so that in equilibrium it is protable
for every borrower to take out a loan independent of the borrowers location between two banks.
More specically, we assume v > 3
4
t+ 1
2
fiB + iA + (1  ) [2  B (1 + iB)  A (1 + iA)]g.
Borrowers and banks are risk neutral and maximize prots. We take it as given that each
bank disposes of enough funds to nance all borrowers applying for a credit. We assume that
banks can observe the location of borrowers.4 Borrowers with bad projects that are denied
credit do not apply for credit at another bank because banks can deduce from the borrowers
location that they have unsuccessfully applied for a loan at another bank.
The time structure of the game is as follows. At stage 1, market B opens up to the entry
of one representative foreign bank. At stage 2, borrowers apply for credit at the banks. Banks
engage in screening the borrowers. At stage 3, returns realize and all borrowers having invested
in good projects pay back their loan.
4 Choice of Entry Mode
In this section, we study the incentives of the foreign bank to grant cross border loans or to
expand via greeneld investment or the acquisition of a domestic bank. For expositional clarity
we proceed as follows. We rst look at how the decision of the foreign bank to concede cross
border loans or to not expand abroad is determined by the foreign banks screening ability.
Then, we incorporate the option of greeneld investment and determine how this modies the
entry mode choice of the foreign bank. Finally, we further allow for the acquisition of a domestic
bank. Hence, our aim is to derive the entry mode pattern of foreign banks depending on the
degree of their screening e¢ ciency.
3Note that our assumptions concerning entry costs ensure that the richest possible entry mode pattern is
indeed achieved. Without these assumptions, some entry modes may drop out of the pattern. However, it is
important to see that without these assumptions, the order of the entry mode pattern would not change.
4As e.g. in DellAriccia (2001), this assumption considerably simplies our analysis. Note that we abstract
from the possibility of price discrimination of borrowers.
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4.1 Cross Border Lending
The foreign bank enters market B via cross border lending if it thereby makes positive prots
in the host banking market. The prot of the foreign bank in the host banking market is given
by
CBLA =


 
rCBLA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mCBLA   FCBL: (1)
When the foreign bank o¤ers cross border loans, it has no access to soft information about
borrowers and, in addition, a fairly limited knowledge of the local banking market. Hence, the
foreign bank identies a rather low fraction A of borrowers with bad projects but cannot
distinguish between the remaining fraction (1  A) of bad borrowers and the borrowers with
good projects. Accordingly, the foreign bank nances the fraction (1  A) of borrowers
investing in bad projects as well as all borrowers with good projects applying for credit. Since
bad borrowers do not make any repayments, the foreign bank incurs a cost of 1 + iA on this
group. The fraction  of good borrowers, however, repays the loan with interest so that the bank
obtains the margin rCBLA   iA on those clients. The market share of the foreign bank is derived
in the Appendix (see proof of Lemma 1) and is given by mCBLA = m

1
3
+
rCBLB1
+rCBLB2
 2rCBLA
2t

.
Fixed entry costs amount to FCBL.5
Host country banks do not incur any soft information problems or xed costs. Accordingly,
their prot is given by
CBLBj =
h


rCBLBj   iB

  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)
i
mCBLBj ; j = 1; 2 (2)
with CBLB1 =
1
3
+
rCBLA +r
CBL
B2
 2rCBLB1
2t
and CBLB2 =
1
3
+
rCBLA +r
CBL
B1
 2rCBLB2
2t
.
Banks maximize their prot with respect to the interest rates they ask from borrowers. We
state the resulting equilibrium prots in Lemma 1:
Lemma 1 If foreign bank entry takes place via cross border lending, equilibrium prots of banks
are given by
CBLA = mt
eCBLA 2   FCBL (3)
CBLBj = mt
eCBLB 2  CBLB 8 j (4)
with eCBLA = 25t [56t++ (1  ) (1 + iA) A], eCBLB = 15t [53t   (1  ) (1 + iA) A]
and  = iB   iA   (1  ) (1 + iB) B.
Proof: see Appendix.
5In our analysis, we focus on the interaction of foreign and domestic banks and, therefore, abstract from
the possible exit of domestic banks.
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The foreign bank enters the host banking market via cross border lending as soon as the
quality of its screening technology allows it to make positive prots in market B, that is,
CBLA  0. Our result is stated in Proposition 1.6
Proposition 1 The foreign bank enters the host banking market via cross border lending if its
screening e¢ ciency is higher than the threshold value CBLA . That is, if
A  CBLA =
5
2
q
tFCBL
m
   5
6
t
 (1  ) (1 + iA) : (5)
Proof: see Appendix.
4.2 Greeneld Investment
When the foreign bank enters the host market via de novo investment, it gains a fairly good
knowledge of the local market due to its large presence and branch network. Yet, it has no
access to soft information about borrowers. Compared to cross border lending, the foreign
bank nances a smaller fraction (1  A) of borrowers with bad projects. However, it incurs
a larger xed entry cost FGR. The foreign banks prot in market B is given by
GRA =


 
rGRA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mGRA   FGR (6)
with GRA =
1
3
+
rGRB1
+rGRB2
 2rGRA
2t
.
Prots of host country banks now amount to
GRBj =
h


rGRBj   iB

  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)
i
mGRBj ; j = 1; 2 (7)
with GRB1 =
1
3
+
rGRA +r
GR
B2
 2rGRB1
2t
and GRB2 =
1
3
+
rGRA +r
GR
B1
 2rGRB2
2t
.
Banks maximize their prot with respect to the interest rates they ask from borrowers. The
equilibrium prots of banks are stated in Lemma 2.
6Note that, in principle, there may be scope for a host country bank to enter the market instead of a foreign
bank. Such a situation would not arise if the starting point of our analysis were a free entry equilibrium of
domestic banks. However, the main e¤ect of a higher number of domestic banks in the market is to drive
down the prot margin of all banks implying a shift of thresholds to the right but leaving the qualitative results
unchanged. Besides, free entry does not take place in the banking sector of many transition and emerging market
economies. The decision over the entry of a bank is very often a case by case analysis and a rather intransparent
process. Even if well-dened regulatory laws exist, measures such as the delay of licensing procedures allow
policy makers to deny entry to a domestic bank and to hand out a license to a foreign bank if so desired.
Since the aim of our analysis is not to compare the impact of foreign versus domestic entry but to analyze the
determinants of di¤erent entry modes of foreign banks, we abstract from entry of domestic banks.
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Lemma 2 In case of greeneld entry, the equilibrium prots of banks are given by
GRA = mt
eGRA 2   FGR (8)
GRBj = mt
eGRB 2  GRB 8j (9)
with eGRA = 25t [56t ++ (1  ) (1 + iA) A] and eGRB = 15t [53t   (1  ) (1 + iA) A].
Proof: see Appendix.
We show in the Appendix (see proof of Proposition 2) that due to the better knowledge
of the host banking market, the prot of the foreign bank rises more sharply in the screening
technology A in case of de novo investment than in case of cross border lending. However, the
xed entry cost is larger with greeneld entry. Hence, as soon as the better market knowledge
compensates for the larger xed entry cost, the foreign bank shifts from cross border lending
to de novo investment at the threshold GRA , originating from 
GR
A  CBLA . Note that we
concentrate our analysis on the most interesting case of the richest possible entry mode pattern,
i.e. we only consider GRA > 
CBL
A .
7 Our results are given in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The foreign bank opts for greeneld entry if its screening e¢ ciency is higher
than the threshold value GRA . That is, if
A  GRA =
p
XGR    56t
 (1 + ) (1  ) (1 + iA) (10)
with XGR = ( + 56t)
2 + 25t(1+)(FGR FCBL)
4m(1 ) .
Proof: see Appendix.
4.3 Entry via Acquisition
By acquiring a host country bank, the foreign bank gets access to all the soft information held
by the target. However, it must pay the endogenous acquisition price PAC . Furthermore, it
incurs an additional xed entry cost FAC . This cost may originate from the restructuring of
the acquired bank or the amortization of bad credits due to asymmetric information concerning
the quality of the targets credit portfolio before the acquisition. Note that the acquisition of
a domestic bank allows the foreign bank to capture a larger market share in comparison to all
other entry modes. In addition, the foreign bank gains from less intense competition since just
7In principle, GRA < 
CBL
A is possible but in that case, cross border lending would be excluded from the
entry mode pattern.
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two banks operate in the market.8 The prot of the foreign bank in the host banking market
if it acquires a local bank is given by
ACA =


 
rACA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mACA   FAC   PAC (11)
with ACA =
1
2
+
rACB  rACA
t
.
The prot of the remaining host country bank amounts to
ACB =


 
rACB   iB
  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)mACB (12)
with ACB =
1
2
+
rACA  rACB
t
.
We now derive the endogenous acquisition price PAC . Throughout our analysis, we will
assume that bargaining power is allocated to the foreign bank. In the range of 0 < A < 
CBL
A ,
the foreign bank would make losses by entering the host banking market via cross border lending
or greeneld entry. Then, clearly, the acquisition price is given by the prot of the domestic
bank in case of no entry, that is, PAC = NEB =
mt
4
(for a derivation of NEB see proof of
Proposition 3). For CBLA  A < GRA , cross border lending constitutes the second best entry
mode for the foreign bank. Hence, by threatening to enter via cross border lending, the foreign
bank can drive down the acquisition price to the prot of the domestic bank if entry occurs via
cross border lending, i.e., PAC = CBLB = mt
eCBLB 2. For GRA  A < 1, greeneld entry
constitutes the second best entry mode for the foreign bank. Accordingly, bank A can threaten
to enter market B via greeneld entry and drive down the acquisition price to the prot of the
domestic bank in case of greeneld entry, that is, PAC = GRB = mt
eGRB 2.
Banks maximize their prot with respect to the interest rates they ask from borrowers.
Equilibrium prots of banks are stated in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 In case of acquisition entry, the equilibrium prots of banks are given by
ACA =
8>>>><>>>>:
mt
eACA 2   mt4   FAC for 0 < A < CBLA
mt[
eACA 2   eCBLB 2]  FAC for CBLA  A < GRA (13)
mt[
eACA 2   eGRB 2]  FAC for GRA  A < 1
ACB = mt
eACB 2 (14)
with eACA = 13t [32t ++ (1  ) (1 + iA) A] and eACB = 13t [32t    (1  )(1 + iA)A].
Proof: see Appendix.
8Fiercer competition in the host banking market in case of greeneld compared to acquisition entry is
conrmed, for instance, by Claeys and Hainz (2006) and Maioli et al. (2006).
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In the Appendix, we show that ACA is increasing in A and jumps upwards twice due to
the changing acquisition prices at CBLA and 
GR
A . Furthermore, 
AC
A is steeper than both 
CBL
A
and GRA . Hence, the richest possible entry mode pattern emerges if 
AC
A intersects with 
GR
A ,
determining the threshold for acquisition entry, ACA with 
AC
A  GRA . Our results regarding
acquisition entry are stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 The foreign bank enters the host banking market via the acquisition of a do-
mestic bank if its screening e¢ ciency is higher than the threshold value ACA . That is, if
A  ACA =
3t (5  2)  2 (9  5)
2 (92   5) (1  ) (1 + iA)

1 
p
XAC

(15)
with XAC = 1 +
(92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 .
Proof: see Appendix.
Hence, only if the foreign bank has access to a highly sophisticated screening technique,
acquisition entry can dominate all other possible entry modes. The intuition behind this result
is as follows. In case of acquisition entry, the prot of the foreign bank rises more sharply
in its screening ability than it does in case of cross border lending or greeneld entry. First,
this is due to the access to soft information. Second, the better the screening technology of
the foreign bank, the lower is the prot of a host country bank in case of de novo entry of
the foreign bank and, accordingly, the lower the acquisition price becomes.9 Hence, only if the
screening technology of the foreign bank is very powerful, it can drive down the acquisition
price to the point that acquisition entry becomes the dominant entry mode.
4.4 Entry Mode Pattern
According to our analysis so far, the richest entry mode pattern to emerge is given as follows.
If the foreign bank has access to a rather ine¢ cient screening ability, entry is not protable.
With an increasing quality of the screening technology, xed entry costs can be covered so that
cross border lending becomes feasible. Due to the foreign banks better market knowledge in
case of greeneld entry compared to cross border lending, a marginal increase in its screening
e¢ ciency implies a larger increase in its prot in case of greeneld entry. Hence, for a high
enough screening e¢ ciency, the foreign bank can compensate for the larger xed entry cost and
shifts from cross border lending to de novo investment. In case of acquisition entry, a marginal
increase in the foreign banks screening e¢ ciency is not mitigated by lower market knowledge
or soft information problems. Furthermore, the acquisition price decreases in the foreign banks
9Note that as we limit our analysis to the richest possible entry mode pattern, the acquisition price is given
by GRB .
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e¢ ciency. Hence, for a high enough screening e¢ ciency of the foreign bank, acquisition becomes
the dominant entry mode.
Note that we limit our analysis to the richest entry mode pattern. Otherwise, it would be
possible that one or more entry modes dropped out of the pattern. However, it is important to
see that the order of the entry mode pattern can never be reversed. Our results are summarized
in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 The richest possible entry mode pattern of foreign banks is given as follows.
Banks with the lowest screening e¢ ciencies do not expand abroad. With increasing e¢ ciency,
banks grant cross border loans. Still more e¢ cient banks opt for de novo investment. The most
e¢ cient banks choose to acquire a host country bank.10
Hence, in line with ndings by Buch and Lipponer (2007) as well as Focarelli and Pozzolo
(2001) we nd that the more protable and e¢ cient a bank is, the more likely it will expand
abroad. Similar to the results in trade theory, we nd that rather less e¢ cient rms engage
in cross border lending, the equivalent to exports in our model, whereas more e¢ cient banks
operate in new markets via a nancial foreign direct investment. However, our results contrast
those derived in the industrial organization literature with its focus on manufacturing industries
in that we nd that the most e¢ cient banks engage in acquisition entry whereas less e¢ cient
banks expand abroad via de novo investment. Similar to our results, Beermann (2007) shows
that the most e¢ cient banks choose to expand via the acquisition of a local bank whereas less
e¢ cient banks opt for greeneld entry.
5 Comparative Statics Analysis
Our framework allows us to study how the development of the host banking market a¤ects the
foreign banks entry mode pattern. In addition, we provide interesting insights into how the
foreign banks choice of entry mode depends on the size of the host banking market.
10Note that our assumption of iA < iB implies that foreign banks can protably enter the host country
with relatively lower screening abilities compared to a scenario in which interest rates were identical. Hence, in
contrast to such a scenario, the threshold values determining the entry mode pattern in our set-up are located
somewhat to the left. Further e¤ects arising from di¤erences in interest rates are derived in the comparative
statics analysis.
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5.1 Development of the Host Banking Market
In our model, several parameters can be interpreted as indicators of nancial development.
First, the less banks need to rely on soft information the more transparent and developed a
nancial market in general is. Second, better screening abilities and lower renancing costs of
host country relative to foreign banks serve as further indicators of development. Finally, a
high degree of competitive pressure in the host banking market is yet another sign of increased
development.
Importance of Access to Soft Information
In more developed banking markets characterized by rather high transparency, banks should
base the evaluation of borrowers projects to a lower extent on soft information. We nd
that when foreign banks need to rely less on soft information, i.e.  increases, entry turns
out to be protable for foreign banks that have access to a less e¢ cient screening technique.
Furthermore, greeneld entry becomes relatively more attractive compared to cross border
lending and acquisition entry. Our results are summarized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 When foreign banks need to rely less on soft information, entry becomes fea-
sible for banks that have access to a less e¢ cient screening technique. The range of greeneld
entry expand whereas the ranges of cross border lending and acquisition entry contract. That is,
dCBLA
d
< 0;
dGRA
d
< 0;
dACA
d
> 0 and
dCBLAd
 < dGRAd
 . (16)
Proof: see Appendix.
To understand the intuition for these results, let us rst look at the threshold CBLA , de-
termining cross border lending. When the foreign bank depends less on the access to soft
information, it can increase its market share and, in addition, less borrowers with bad projects
are nanced. This makes cross border lending protable for less e¢ ciently screening foreign
banks.
Similar e¤ects are at work when we consider the threshold GRA . When the foreign bank needs
to rely to a lower extent on soft information, its market share increases and less bad borrowers
are nanced both with cross border lending and greeneld entry. However, this e¤ect is the
more pronounced, the larger the market share of the foreign bank. Since the foreign banks
market share is larger in case of a de novo investment than with cross border lending, greeneld
entry becomes relatively more attractive compared to cross border lending when foreign banks
depend less on soft information.
We now turn to the attractiveness of acquisition relative to greeneld entry. The acquisition
of a domestic bank ensures access to the soft information held by the target. Note that the
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extent to which the foreign bank depends on access to soft information a¤ects the acquisition
price GRB . The less the foreign bank needs to rely on soft information, the smaller the market
share of the domestic bank is if the foreign bank enters via de novo investment. In turn,
the acquisition price GRB falls and the foreign banks prot increases. While the fall in the
acquisition price is due to a fall in the domestic banks market share only, there are two e¤ects
at work with respect to the prot of the foreign bank if it enters via de novo investment. First,
a lower information disadvantage of the foreign relative to the domestic bank implies a larger
market share of the foreign bank and, second, leads to a fall in the fraction of bad borrowers
nanced by the foreign bank. As a consequence, the increase of the foreign banks prot in case
of greeneld entry dominates the rise in its prot in case of acquisition entry. In sum, greeneld
entry becomes more attractive compared to the acquisition of a local bank when access to soft
information is less important.
We conclude that foreign banks tend to enter via greeneld entry into banking markets
with a higher degree of nancial development. In contrast, in less developed banking markets,
a wider range of foreign banks opt for cross border lending and acquisition entry.
Quality of the Screening Ability of Host Country Banks
We nd that when the screening ability B of host country banks increases, foreign banks
must be relatively better at screening borrowers in order to protably enter a new market.
Furthermore, acquisition entry becomes relatively less attractive compared to greeneld entry.
Our results are stated in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6 An increase in the screening ability of host country banks leads to an in-
crease in all relevant threshold levels. Consequently, foreign banks must possess a relatively
better screening technology in order to protably enter the host banking market. The range of
acquisition entry contracts. That is,
dCBLA
dB
> 0;
dGRA
dB
> 0;
dACA
dB
> 0: (17)
Proof: see Appendix.
Again, let us rst look at the threshold CBLA , determining cross border lending. When host
country banks get access to a relatively better screening technique, the foreign bank loses in
terms of market share. Obviously, entry via cross border lending is then protable for foreign
banks having access to a relatively more sophisticated screening technology only.
When the screening skills of domestic banks improve, the market share and prot of a
foreign bank also falls in case of greeneld entry. However, the fall in the foreign banks prot
is larger with greeneld entry compared to cross border lending due to the beforehand larger
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market share. Hence, greeneld entry becomes relatively less attractive compared to cross
border lending when domestic banks get better in screening potential borrowers.
We nd that when host country banks get access to a better screening technology, acquisition
entry becomes less attractive to foreign banks compared to a de novo investment. This is due to
a fall in the market share of a foreign bank entering the host banking market via the acquisition
of a domestic bank as well as an increase in the acquisition price. Due to this combined e¤ect,
the decrease in the foreign banks prot in case of acquisition entry is larger than the fall of
the foreign banks prot in case of greeneld entry arising from a decreasing market share
only. Thus, acquisition entry is less appealing compared to greeneld entry when the screening
e¢ ciency of domestic banks increases.
When we interpret an increasing screening e¢ ciency of host country banks as a signal for
higher nancial development, we can state as before that the less developed a banking market
is, the more foreign banks tend to enter the market via the acquisition of a domestic bank.
Size of Renancing Costs of Host Country Banks
We nd that when renancing costs iB of host country banks decrease, foreign banks must
possess a relatively better screening technology in order to protably enter a new market. In
addition, cross border lending and acquisition entry lose in attractiveness. Our results are
summarized in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 When renancing costs of host country banks decrease, foreign banks must
have relatively better screening skills in order to protably enter a new market. The ranges of
cross border lending and acquisition entry contract. That is,
dCBLA
diB
< 0;
dGRA
diB
< 0;
dACA
diB
< 0; and
dCBLAdiB
 > dGRAdiB
 (18)
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition for these results is as follows. When host country banks incur relatively
lower renancing costs, foreign banks lose in terms of market share. Obviously, entry becomes
attractive only for relatively better screening foreign banks.
Since the e¤ect of a falling market share is larger in case of greeneld entry compared to cross
border lending due to the beforehand larger market share, greeneld entry becomes relatively
less attractive compared to cross border lending when renancing conditions of domestic banks
improve.
When renancing costs of host country banks decrease, acquisition entry becomes less at-
tractive compared to greeneld entry. Note that the market share of the foreign bank in case
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of acquisition entry falls and, in addition, the acquisition price increases. Due to this com-
bined e¤ect, the fall of the prot of the foreign bank with acquisition entry is larger than the
decrease of the prot in case of de novo investment originating from a declining market share
only. Therefore, acquisition entry becomes less attractive compared to greeneld entry when
renancing costs of domestic banks fall.
Note that the e¤ects of falling interest rates of domestic banks are equivalent to the impact
of increasing interest rates of foreign banks. By interpreting better renancing conditions of
host country banks relative to foreign banks as a sign of increased nancial development, we
again conclude that in banking markets on a lower stage of development, foreign banks tend to
choose cross border lending and acquisition entry when entering the host banking market.
Degree of Competitive Pressure in the Host Banking Market
We are further interested in how the degree of competition in the host banking market
inuences the entry mode decision of a foreign bank. The competitive pressure in the local
banking market can be expressed by the inverse of transportation cost 1
t
. Note that the larger
the transportation cost parameter t and the more costly it becomes for borrowers to travel to
a bank, the less intense price competition will be between banks. Conversely, the higher is 1
t
,
the more competitive is the market environment.
We nd that foreign banks must possess a relatively better screening technology in order to
protably enter highly competitive markets. Furthermore, acquisition entry loses in attractive-
ness in host banking markets characterized by rather intense competition. The e¤ects on cross
border lending and greeneld entry are ambiguous. Our results are stated in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 When competitive pressure in the host banking market increases, foreign banks
must be relatively better at screening borrowers in order to protably enter a new market. For
GRA <
eGRA , the range of cross border lending contracts whereas the range of greeneld entry
expands. For GRA > eGRA , the e¤ect of rising competition on cross border lending and greeneld
entry is ambiguous. The range of acquisition entry unambiguously contracts. That is,
(1) d
CBL
A
d( 1t )
> 0;
dGRA
d( 1t )
< 0;
dACA
d( 1t )
> 0 for GRA <
15(FGR FCBL)
4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA)  eGRA (19)
(2) d
CBL
A
d( 1t )
> 0;
dGRA
d( 1t )
> 0;
dACA
d( 1t )
> 0 for GRA > eGRA . (20)
Proof: see Appendix.
The intuition behind these results is as follows. Again, we rst turn to the threshold CBLA .
Increasing competitive pressure in the host banking market results in declining interest rates
of all banks. It follows that in order for cross border lending to be protable, the foreign bank
must have access to a relatively better screening technology.
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The e¤ect of rising competition on the threshold GRA is ambiguous. Note, beforehand, that
the interest rate the foreign bank charges in case of cross border lending is higher than in case
of greeneld entry. In contrast, the market share of the foreign bank in case of cross border
lending is smaller compared to a de novo investment. Increasing competitive pressure leads
to a fall both in interest rates and market shares. Hence, the overall e¤ect is ambiguous. We
nd that for A < eGRA , the interest rate e¤ect dominates so that greeneld entry gains at the
expense of cross border lending. However, for A > eGRA , the market share e¤ect is the driving
factor which implies that cross border lending becomes relatively more attractive compared to
greeneld entry.
We now examine the impact of an increase in competitive pressure on the attractiveness of
acquisition entry. Note that an increase in competition implies lower interest rates and prots
both in case of greeneld and acquisition entry. In addition, the acquisition price falls. Since,
however, the fall in prot is larger in case of acquisition compared to greeneld entry, the
acquisition of a domestic bank is less appealing the more intense competition is.
Note that tough competition serves as an indicator of high nancial development. Falling
transportation costs may reect an increased transparency in the market as well as a higher
standardization of nancial products implying less pronounced preferences of borrowers for a
certain type of bank. Alternatively, the introduction of new information and communication
technologies in banking may lead to a fall in physical transportation costs of borrowers. We
conclude as before that the less developed a host banking market is, the more foreign banks
opt for entry via acquisition.
5.2 Size of the Host Banking Market
We now turn to the impact of the size of the host banking market measured in terms of the
mass of borrowersm on the entry mode choice of foreign banks. We nd that the larger the host
banking market, the more easily entry becomes protable for less e¢ ciently screening foreign
banks. Furthermore, the larger the host country, the more appealing greeneld entry and the
less attractive acquisition entry become. Our results are stated in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9 The larger the host banking market, the more easily entry becomes protable
for less e¢ ciently screening foreign banks. The range of greeneld entry expands and the range
of acquisition entry contracts. That is,
dCBLA
dm
< 0;
dGRA
dm
< 0;
dACA
dm
> 0 (21)
Proof: see Appendix.
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Clearly, the prot of a foreign bank operating in the host banking market via cross border
lending is the higher, the larger the host banking market. It follows that in larger markets,
cross border lending becomes protable for foreign banks with relatively lower screening skills.
The larger the host banking market, the higher a foreign banks prot both in case of cross
border lending and greeneld entry is. Again, the rise in the foreign banks prot due to an
increase in the market size is more pronounced in case of greeneld entry due to the beforehand
larger market share so that a de novo investment becomes more attractive compared to cross
border lending.
In case of acquisition entry, a greater market size also allows the foreign bank to serve more
customers, implying an increase in its prot. However, there is a countervailing e¤ect since
the acquisition price rises, too. Overall, the increase in the prot of a foreign bank in case of
greeneld entry dominates the rise in prot in case of acquisition entry. Hence, the larger the
host banking market, the more appealing greeneld entry compared to acquisition entry is for
a foreign bank.
We can further conclude from our analysis that foreign banks tend to prefer nancial foreign
direct investments, i.e. de novo investments and acquisitions, over cross border lending the
more, the larger the host banking market is.
5.3 Empirical Evidence
In this section, we showed that in less developed banking markets, foreign banks tend to opt for
cross border lending and acquisition entry. In contrast, we found a tendency towards greeneld
entry in banking markets on a higher level of nancial development. Empirical literature
related to our comparative statics analysis is scarce. Nevertheless, our result of a trend towards
cross border lending in rather low developed banking markets is conrmed by García Herrero
and Martínez Pería (2007). Beermann (2007) nds that greeneld entry becomes more likely
compared to acquisition entry the more developed a host banking market is.
Furthermore, we investigated how the entry mode decision of foreign banks depends on the
size of the host banking market. From our analysis, we concluded that foreign banks tend
to prefer nancial foreign direct investments, i.e. de novo investments and acquisitions, over
cross border lending the larger the host banking market is. Buch and Lipponer (2007), García
Herrero and Martínez Pería (2007) and Tekin-Koru (2006) all nd empirical support for this
outcome. We also demonstrated that the larger a host country is, the larger the acquisition
price becomes and the less attractive the acquisition of a local bank is. Hence, we found that
foreign banks tend to favor acquisition entry in small host banking markets and greeneld
entry in larger countries. Evidence for this result is provided by Ra¤ et al. (2006). In addition,
Correa (2008) concludes that domestic banks that are located in small countries are more likely
to be acquired compared to banks operating in larger countries.
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6 Welfare Analysis and Implications for the
Regulation of Foreign Bank Entry
In this section we derive the preferred entry mode pattern of the host banking markets policy
maker and compare it to the entry mode pattern favored by the foreign banks. The host
countrys policy maker maximizes welfare consisting of the sum of borrower rents and rents of
domestic banks. Borrower rents are captured by the willingness to pay of borrowers minus the
repayments of borrowers to banks and their transport costs. Bank rents comprise the revenues
of banks minus their costs. Rents of foreign banks are not included in welfare.
We compare the di¤erent welfare functions in case of no entry, WNE, cross border lending,
WCBL, greeneld entry,WGR, and acquisition entry,WAC , in order to derive the preferred entry
mode pattern of the policy maker. The welfare functions are given in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4 The welfare functions in case of no entry, cross border lending, greeneld entry,
and acquisition entry are given as follows:
WNE = m[ (v   iB) (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)  t8 ] (22)
WCBL = mfv   t12   13
 erCBLA + 2erCBLB + 1t     12  erCBLB   erCBLA 2+
2[1
3
  1
2t
 erCBLB   erCBLA ][  erCBLB   iB  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)]g (23)
WGR = mfv   t12   13
 erGRA + 2erGRB + 1t     12  erGRB   erGRA 2 + 2[13   12t  erGRB   erGRA ]
[
 erGRB   iB  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)]g (24)
WAC = mf[v   erACA  12 + 1t  erACB   erACA    12   1t  erACB   erACA  iB]  
1
2
  1
t
 erACB   erACA  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)  t2 [14 + 1t2  erACB   erACA 2]+
1
25t
[5
3
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) A]2g (25)
Proof: see Appendix.
By comparing the di¤erent welfare functions we arrive at the preferred entry mode pattern
of the policy maker. Our results are summarized in Proposition 10.
Proposition 10 The policy maker prefers a foreign bank not to enter the market when it is
rather ine¢ cient in screening borrowers. Greeneld entry is favored for intermediate screening
e¢ ciencies of foreign banks. If a foreign bank is highly e¢ cient in screening borrowers, the
policy maker prefers it to acquire a local bank. That is,
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(1 ) WNE > WCBL;WGR;WAC for A < 
GR
W (26)
(2 ) WGR > WCBL;WNE;WAC for 
GR
W < A < 
AC
W (27)
(3 ) WAC > WCBL;WNE;WGR for 
AC
W < A (28)
with GRW =
5
12
t
p
252 17+3 

 (3 1)
(1 )(3 1)(1+iA) and 
AC
W = x
W
AC +
5
p
XWAC
2(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)] ,
xWAC =
[ 15
2
t(6 5) [25(4 1) 18(5 2)]]
(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)] ,
XWAC = t
2ft[25 (10 + 172   3) + 18 (6  302   11+ 82)]+
72 (1  ) [5 (4  3) + 6  5]g+ 72 (1  )2 (4   1) (5   2)2.
Proof: see Appendix.
Note, beforehand, that cross border lending is strictly dominated by greeneld entry. This
result is mainly driven by the fact that interest rates of foreign banks are lower in case of
greeneld entry than cross border lending due to the better knowledge of the market which
benets local borrowers.
The intuition of our results mainly rests on the impact of the foreign banks screening ability
on, rst, the payments of borrowers to foreign banks and, second, costs of domestic banks. Note
that the payments of borrowers to foreign banks are zero in case of no entry, of intermediate
size in case of greeneld entry, and largest in case of acquisition entry. In contrast, the costs
of domestic banks vary with market shares and are highest in case of no entry, lower if foreign
banks enter via de novo investment, and smallest with acquisition entry.
Obviously, if no foreign bank enters the market, an increasing screening e¢ ciency of the
foreign bank has no impact on the payments of borrowers to foreign banks and costs of domestic
banks. Yet, in case of greeneld entry, an increase in the quality of the foreign banks screening
technology drives down the interest rates foreign banks ask as well as the costs of domestic
banks due to falling market shares. Hence, as soon as the screening ability of the foreign bank
is larger than the threshold GRW , greeneld entry is preferred to no entry by the policy maker.
Moreover, the negative e¤ect of an increasing screening e¢ ciency of the foreign bank on interest
rates asked by foreign banks and costs of domestic banks is even larger in case of acquisition
entry. Thus, for a screening ability of the foreign bank larger than ACW , the policy maker favors
acquisition over greeneld entry. We show in the Appendix that GRW < 
AC
W holds (see proof of
Proposition 10).
Before we turn to how the regulation of foreign bank entry is shaped, let us explain that
the policy maker may face di¢ culties when trying to enforce greeneld entry. Greeneld entry
is protable for foreign banks if GRA  0 holds which is equivalent to A  bGRA (see proof of
Proposition 11). If bGRA > GRW holds, de novo investment is not protable for foreign banks with
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screening abilities in the range GRW  A < bGRA . Hence, for this parameter range, greeneld
entry cannot be implemented by the policy maker.11
However, acquisition entry can be enforced whenever the policy maker prefers this entry
mode. We show in the Appendix that ACW > 
AC
A holds (see proof of Proposition 11). Clearly,
for A  ACA , foreign banks make prots by entering via acquisition entry as ACA constitutes the
threshold for which foreign banks prefer acquisition entry over all other entry modes. Hence,
no di¢ culties arise for the policy maker to enforce entry via acquisition since ACW > 
AC
A .
Let us now look in more detail at the regulation of foreign bank entry. Although - apart
from cross border lending - the policy makers preferred entry mode pattern is similar to the one
favored by the foreign banks, our model still provides interesting implications concerning the
regulation of foreign bank entry. Our results from the comparison of the threshold values GRW
and ACW that determine the policy makers preferred entry mode pattern and the thresholds
CBLA ; 
GR
A ; and 
AC
A dening the entry mode pattern preferred by the foreign banks as derived
in section 4 are given in Proposition 11.
Proposition 11 Entry is permitted but to foreign banks that rather e¢ ciently screen borrowers.
The more competitive the host market environment is, the lower the requirements concerning
a foreign banks screening e¢ ciency for entry are set. Cross border lending is not allowed for.
Moreover, only the most e¢ ciently screening foreign banks are allowed to acquire a domestic
bank. Foreign banks that wish to grant cross border loans or acquire a local bank are forced to
enter via de novo investment if their screening skills are insu¢ ciently low. That is,
(1) CBLA < bGRA < GRW (29)
(2) ACA < 
AC
W (30)
(3) d
GR
W
d( 1t )
< 0. (31)
Proof: see Appendix.
Consider Figure 1 for our explanations. Three locations are possible for the threshold
GRW as is shown in the three di¤erent scenarios. Note that the more competitive the host
market environment is, the more GRW shifts to the left and the lower the policy maker sets the
requirements concerning a foreign banks screening e¢ ciency for entry.
Let us rst look at foreign banks that wish to grant cross border loans. In scenario (1),
foreign banks with e¢ ciency level CBLA  A < GRW are denied entry whereas foreign banks
with e¢ ciency GRW  A < GRA are forced to enter via de novo investment instead of cross
11In principle, the policy maker could also make a payment to the foreign bank in order to induce it to enter
the market compensating for the loss of the foreign bank from operating in the host country. Then, greeneld
entry could take place within the range GRW  A < bGRA . However, note that GRW will move a little to the right
since the payments to the foreign bank let the welfare function shift downwards. Since our qualitative results
do not change, we abstract from payments to foreign banks.
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border lending. Both in scenario (2) and (3), all foreign banks that want to operate via cross
border lending are denied entry.
Second, consider foreign banks that favor entry via de novo investment. Depending on the
location of GRW , these banks may either enter via their preferred entry mode in scenario (1) or
be denied entry in scenario (3). In scenario (2), banks with a screening e¢ ciency in the range
of GRA  A < GRW are not granted an entry permit whereas banks with screening e¢ ciency
GRW  A < ACA are allowed to enter via de novo investment.
forced to GR
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Ad0 1
GR
Ad
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Wd
Scenario (1): high competitive pressure:
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NE GR AC
entry denied forced to GR forced to GR
EMP preferred by FBs
EMP enforced by PM
Ad
CBL
Ad0 1
GR
Ad
AC
Ad
GR
Adˆ
AC
Wd
GR
Wd
NE CBL GR AC
NE GR AC
entry denied forced to GR
EMP preferred by FBs
EMP enforced by PM
Ad
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Scenario (2): intermediate competitive pressure: ACAGRWGRA ddd <<
Scenario (3): low competitive pressure: ACWGRWACA ddd <<
EMP: Entry Mode Pattern;   FB: Foreign Banks;   PM: Policy Maker
Figure 1: Regulation of Foreign Bank Entry
Finally, let us examine the situation of foreign banks that prefer to acquire a domestic bank.
Foreign banks with a screening e¢ ciency larger than ACW are in all three scenarios allowed to
acquire a local bank. In scenario (1) and (2), banks with screening e¢ ciency ACA  A < ACW
are forced to enter via de novo investment. In scenario (3), banks with a screening e¢ ciency in
the range ACA  A < GRW are denied entry and banks with a screening e¢ ciency in the range
GRW  A < ACW are forced to enter via de novo investment.
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Hence, the regulation of foreign bank entry is shaped as follows. Entry is permitted but to
foreign banks that rather e¢ ciently screen borrowers. The more competitive the host market
environment is, the lower the policy maker sets the requirements concerning a foreign banks
screening e¢ ciency for entry. Hence, the less competitive the market environment is, the more
likely it is that foreign banks are denied entry. The policy maker does not allow for cross
border lending. Moreover, regulators grant a permit to acquire a domestic bank only to the
most e¢ ciently screening foreign banks. Foreign banks that intend to expand via cross border
lending or the acquisition of a local bank are forced to enter via de novo investment if their
screening skills are insu¢ ciently low.
Note that although the policy maker may not perfectly observe the screening e¢ ciency of
a foreign bank, the quality of its screening technology may be proxied by the size of loan loss
provisions or the rating of the bank. Moreover, as has been found by Berger (2007) and Köhler
(2008), the regulation of acquisition entry not only takes place explicitly via restrictions on
ownership shares but also implicitly via, for instance, the delay of licensing procedures.
García Herrero and Martínez Pería (2007) provide support for our nding that cross border
lending is least liked by the policy maker of the host country. However, their argument is
somewhat di¤erent. They suggest that cross border lending implies a greater volatility in
capital ows and is therefore often impeded by taxes or capital controls on foreign loans. Peek
and Rosengren (2000) point to the problem that cross border lending is more di¢ cult for the
host country supervisors to monitor or inuence.
Although a large part of foreign bank entry into Latin American and transition countries
occurred via the acquisition of domestic banks, this was often due to the need to recapitalize
domestic banks in the aftermath of banking crises in Latin America (Martínez Pería and Mody,
2004) as well as due to large privatization programs in transition economies (Vo Thi and Ven-
cappa, 2007). In fact, the literature generally points to the extensive regulation of acquisition
compared to greeneld entry. Examples are Berger et al. (2008), Majnoni et al. (2003), and
Peek and Rosengren (2000).
7 Empirical Hypotheses
Our model gives rise to several testable hypotheses concerning both the entry mode decision
of multinational banks and the regulation of foreign bank entry. We state our rst hypothesis
with respect to the entry mode pattern favored by foreign banks.
Hypothesis 1 In a given banking market, banks with the lowest screening e¢ ciencies do not
expand abroad. With increasing e¢ ciency, banks grant cross border loans. Still more e¢ cient
24
banks opt for de novo investment. The most e¢ cient banks choose to access a new market via
the acquisition of a local bank.
We further analyzed how the multinational banks entry mode choice is a¤ected by the
nancial development of host countries. Based on our results, we formulate our second testable
prediction.
Hypothesis 2 The less developed a host banking market is, the wider the range of foreign banks
that opt for cross border lending and acquisition entry. In more developed banking markets a
trend towards de novo investment exists.
Our ndings concerning the impact of the size of host countries on the entry mode choice
of foreign banks gives rise to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 The larger a host banking market is, the wider the range of foreign banks that
expand via a nancial foreign direct investment compared to cross border lending. More specif-
ically, foreign banks tend to favor the acquisition of a domestic bank when they enter rather
small countries and de novo investment when they commence to operate in rather large banking
markets.
We formulate our last testable prediction with respect to our ndings regarding the regula-
tion of foreign bank entry.
Hypothesis 4 Foreign banks present in a given host banking market are rather e¢ cient in
screening borrowers. The more competitive the market environment, the lower the requirements
concerning a foreign banks screening e¢ ciency for entry are and, accordingly, the lower the
average screening e¢ ciency of foreign banks is expected to be. Cross border lending tends to
be most strictly regulated. The most e¢ cient foreign banks in the market tend to be those that
have acquired a domestic bank.
A test of our rst three hypotheses requires data on the home markets of multinational
banks. Only then one can account for a certain range of banks actually not expanding abroad.
With respect to our second and third hypothesis, additional information on the nancial devel-
opment and the size of the host markets of multinational banks are needed. Moreover, a test
of our rst three hypotheses should be based on rather little regulated host banking markets.
Clearly, a test of our last prediction requires data on host countries of foreign banks where
regulation of foreign bank entry indeed takes places.
Throughout the empirical analysis, the screening e¢ ciency of foreign and host country banks
could be proxied by the size of loan loss provisions or the rating of a bank. Soft information
problems may be captured by the physical, cultural, legal or economic distance between foreign
and host banking markets. The soft information variable needs to be interacted with a dummy
variable that captures entry via cross border lending or greeneld investment on the one hand
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and acquisition of a domestic bank on the other hand. Competitive pressure may be proxied by
the degree of product di¤erentiation or by the degree of transparency in the banking market.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyzed a foreign banks trade-o¤between cross border lending and a nancial
foreign direct investment, i.e. greeneld or acquisition entry. We showed that if foreign banks
are rather ine¢ cient in screening borrowers, they choose not to expand abroad. With increasing
e¢ ciency, banks grant cross border loans. Still more e¢ cient banks opt for de novo investment
whereas the most e¢ cient banks favor the acquisition of a local bank.
Moreover, we investigated how the entry mode choice of foreign banks is a¤ected by the
host countrys development and size. We found that the less developed a banking market is, the
wider the range of foreign banks that opt for cross border lending and acquisition entry and the
smaller the range of foreign banks that expand via de novo investment. Moreover, the smaller
the host banking market, the larger the range of foreign banks that prefer the acquisition of a
domestic bank and the smaller the range of foreign banks that favor greeneld entry.
Finally, we studied the regulation of foreign bank entry. We showed that entry is permitted
but to foreign banks that rather e¢ ciently screen borrowers. Furthermore, the less competitive
the market environment is, the more likely it is that foreign banks are denied entry. Cross
border lending is not allowed for. Foreign banks that intend to expand via cross border lending
or the acquisition of a local bank are forced to enter via de novo investment if their screening
e¢ ciency is insu¢ ciently low.
Our model set-up allows for several interesting extensions. First, we might not only consider
the inuence of the host countrys development but also the impact of the development of a
foreign banks home country on its entry mode choice. If we interpret a foreign banks screening
e¢ ciency as an indicator of its home markets development, our model implies the following
results. Banks based in the most developed countries would tend to expand via acquisitions.
Banks from less developed countries would opt for de novo investment. Banks based in still
less developed countries would prefer to grant cross border loans whereas banks located in the
least developed countries would not expand abroad.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to allow for asymmetries in domestic banks. If local
banks di¤ered in their screening abilities, the incentives of foreign banks to acquire a domestic
bank would depend on a trade-o¤as follows. A lower e¢ ciency would imply a smaller acquisition
price. However, costs related to restructuring processes or the amortization of bad credits might
be much higher for less e¢ cient local banks.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
The marginal borrower between bank A and B1 and bank A and B2 is given by
xCBLA;B1 =
1
6
+
rCBLB1
 rCBLA
2t
and xCBLA;B2 =
1
6
+
rCBLB2
 rCBLA
2t
.
It follows that the market share of banks can be expressed by mCBLA , m
CBL
B1
and mCBLB2 with
CBLA  13 +
rCBLB1
+rCBLB2
 2rCBLA
2t
, CBLB1  13 +
rCBLA +r
CBL
B2
 2rCBLB1
2t
and CBLB2  13 +
rCBLA +r
CBL
B1
 2rCBLB2
2t
.
Hence, banksprot functions are given by
CBLA =


 
rCBLA   iA
  (1  ) (1  A) (1 + iA)mCBLA   FCBL
CBLBj =
h


rCBLBj   iB

  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)
i
mCBLBj .
dCBLA
drCBLA
!
= 0,
dCBLB1
drCBLB1
!
= 0, and
dCBLB2
drCBLB2
!
= 0 implies
erCBLA = 15f53t + 2iB + 3iA + (1  ) [5  2B (1 + iB)  3A (1 + iA)]gerCBLB1 = rCBLB2 = 15f53t + 4iB + iA + (1  ) [5  4B (1 + iB)  A (1 + iA)]g  rCBLB
CBLA = mt
eCBLA 2   FCBL and CBLB1 = CBLB2 = mt eCBLB 2  CBLB
with market shares eCBLA  25t [56t++ (1  ) (1 + iA) A] and eCBLB1 = eCBLB2 = 15t [53t 
   (1  ) (1 + iA) A]  eCBLB and   iB   iA   (1  ) (1 + iB) B.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Note that d
CBL
A
dA
= 4m(1 )(1+iA)
5
eCBLA > 0 and d2CBLAd2A = 2mt [25 (1  ) (1 + iA)]2 > 0 so that
CBLA is increasing and convex in A. Cross border lending is feasible for bank A if 
CBL
A  0.
Solving for bank As screening ability yields A 
5
2
q
tFCBL
m
   5
6
t
(1 )(1+iA)  
CBL
A .
Note that since CBLA is increasing and convex in A it follows that argmin
A2R
fCBLA g =  
5
6
t+
(1 )(1+iA) <
0. Hence, 5
6
t+ > 0 must hold. We will refer to this condition as Condition (1): 5
6
t+ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2:
Analogous to Proof of Lemma 1 we arrive at
erGRA = 15f53t + 2iB + 3iA + (1  ) [5  2B (1 + iB)  3A (1 + iA)]g,erGRB1 = rGRB2 = 15f53t + 4iB + iA + (1  ) [5  4B (1 + iB)  A (1 + iA)]g  rGRB ,
GRA = mt
eGRA 2   FGR and GRB1 = GRB2 = mt eGRB 2  GRB :
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Proof of Proposition 2:
Note that d
GR
A
dA
= 4m(1 )(1+iA)
5
eGRA > 0 and d2GRAd2A = 2mt [25 (1  ) (1 + iA)]2 > 0. Further,
due to eGRB > eCBLB and 0 <  < 1 it holds that dGRAdA > dCBLAdA and d2GRAd2A > d2CBLAd2A . Since it
also holds that CBLA jA=0= mtf 25t [56t + (iB   iA)]g2   FCBL > GRA jA=0= mtf 25t [56t +
(iB   iA)]g2   FGR due to FGR > FCBL, it follows that only one intersection between GRA and
CBLA is possible for A > 0. Greeneld entry is feasible for bank A in case of 
GR
A  CBLA .
Solving for bank As screening ability yields
A 
p
XGR   56 t
(1+)(1 )(1+iA)  
GR
A with XGR  ( + 56t)2 + 25t(1+)(FGR FCBL)4m(1 ) .
Proof of Lemma 3:
Analogous to Proof of Lemma 1 we arrive at
erACA = 13f32t + iB + 2iA + (1  ) [3  B (1 + iB)  2A (1 + iA)]g,erACB = 13f32t + 2iB + iA + (1  ) [3  2B (1 + iB)  A (1 + iA)]g,
ACA = mtf
eACA 2g   PAC   FAC and ACB = mt eACB 2.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Derivation of Domestic BanksProts with no Foreign Bank Entry
Analogous to Proof of Lemma 1 we arrive at
erNEB1 = erNEB2 = 12 [t + 2iB + 2 (1  B (1 + iB)) (1  )]  erNEB and NEB1 = NEB2 = mt4  NEB .
Derivation of ACA
Note, rst, that it is useful to show that (1) d
AC
A
dA
>
dCBLA
dA
in the range of CBLA  A < GRA
and (2) d
AC
A
dA
>
dGRA
dA
in the range of GRA  A < 1:
(1) proof of d
AC
A
dA
>
dCBLA
dA
for CBLA  A < GRA
Note that d
AC
A
dA
= 2m (1  ) (1 + iA)

1
3
eACA + 15eCBLB  > 0 and d2ACAd2A = 2mt (1   )2(1 +
iA)
2
 
1
9
  1
25
22

> 0. Note also, beforehand, that by abstracting from exit of domestic banks,eGRA  23 must hold due to the symmetric location of banks on the Salop circle. eGRA  23 is
equivalent to 5
6
t       (1  ) (1 + iA) A  0. We will use this condition further on and
refer to it as Condition (2): 5
6
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) A  0. From Condition (2) follows a
further useful condition which we will refer to as Condition (3): 5
6
t   > 0.
Note that d
AC
A
dA
>
dCBLA
dA
is equivalent to 5
6
t   5(9 5)
9(5 2)  
5(922 5)
9(5 2) (1  ) (1 + iA) A > 0
which is fullled due to Condition (2) since numerical simulations show that  1 < 5(9 5)
9(5 2) < 1
and
5(922 5)
9(5 2) < . Hence, 
AC
A and 
CBL
A may intersect only once.
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(2) proof of d
AC
A
dA
>
dGRA
dA
for GRA  A < 1
Note that d
AC
A
dA
= 2m (1  ) (1 + iA) [13eACA + 5eGRB ] > 0 and d2ACAd2A = 2mt (1  )2 (1 + iA)2
1
9
  2
25

> 0. d
AC
A
dA
>
dGRA
dA
is equivalent to 9
8
t      9 5
4
(1  ) (1 + iA) A > 0 which is
fullled due to Condition (2) as 9 5
4
< . Hence, ACA and 
GR
A may intersect only once.
As a consequence, ACA is increasing in A and jumps upwards twice due to the changing
acquisition prices at CBLA and 
GR
A . Since, according to the above calculations, 
AC
A is steeper
than both CBLA and 
GR
A , in principle, four possible locations exist for 
AC
A . First, 
AC
A could
lie above CBLA and 
GR
A , thus eliminating cross border lending and greeneld entry from the
entry mode pattern. Second, ACA could intersect with 
CBL
A which would exclude greeneld
entry from the entry mode pattern. Third, and most interesting for us, ACA could intersect
with GRA , allowing for the richest possible entry mode pattern. Fourth, 
AC
A may be located
below CBLA and 
GR
A , thus excluding acquisition entry from the entry mode pattern.
Since we concentrate throughout our analysis on the richest possible entry mode pattern, bank
A chooses acquisition entry for ACA  GRA . Solving for bank As screening ability yields
A  3t(5 2) 2(9 5)2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  ACA withXAC  1+(92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)](3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 .
Proof of Proposition 5:
dCBLA
d
=   1

CBLA < 0 and
dGRA
d
=   1

GRA < 0.
dCBLAd  < dGRAd  holds as CBLA < GRA .
dACA
d
=  9[(9
2 5)( 13 t+)+45](1 
p
XAC)
(1 )(1+iA)(92 5)2  
9[45+2(92 5)( 13 t+)]
2(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC(92 5)2
(92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2
with   1
45
[3t (5  2)  2 (9  5)].
Since (
92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 = XAC 1 =
 p
XAC   1
  p
XAC + 1

, it follows
dACA
d
= 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

2
5
p
XAC
[ 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

 (1  ) (1 + iA) +
 
1
3
t +

].
Due to 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

= ACA , this expression can be written as
dACA
d
=
4ACA
25
p
XAC
f5
6
t ++ 3
2
[ + 5
3
 (1  ) (1 + iA) ACA ]g.
Note, rst, that 5
6
t+ > 0 due to Condition (1). Second, as we assume A > B it must hold
that eACB = 13t [32t  (1  ) (1 + iA) A] < 12 . This is equivalent to+(1  ) (1 + iA) A >
0. By assuming 5
3
  1, or, respectively,   0:6, we have that 3
2
[+ 5
3
 (1  ) (1 + iA) ACA ] 
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0.12 Third,  = 1
45
[3t (5  2)   2 (9  5)] > 0 is equivalent to 5
6
t   5(9 5)
9(5 2) > 0 which
holds due to Condition (3) since 0 < 5(9 5)
9(5 2) < 1. Hence, it holds that
dACA
d
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 6:
dCBLA
dB
= 1+iB
(1+iA)
> 0 and d
GR
A
dB
= (1 )(1+iB)p
XGR
GRA > 0
dACA
dB
=
(1+iB)(9 5)(1 
p
XAC)
(1+iA)(92 5) +
(1+iB)(9 5)
(1+iA)(92 5)
p
XAC
(92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 +
8(1+iB)( 98 t )
45(1+iA)
p
XAC
.
With (
92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 = XAC   1 =
 p
XAC   1
  p
XAC + 1

we get
dACA
dB
= 2(1+iB)(1 )(9 5)
45
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
 
2(1+iB)(1 )(9 5)(1+
p
XAC)
45
p
XAC
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

+
8(1+iB)( 98 t )
45(1+iA)
p
XAC
.
Since 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

= ACA it follows that
dACA
dB
=
2(1+iB)[4( 98 t ) (1 )(1+iA)(9 5)ACA ]
45(1+iA)
p
XAC
.
Note that 4
 
9
8
t    (1  ) (1 + iA) (9  5) ACA > 0 is equivalent to 98t    9 54 (1 
)(1 + iA)
AC
A > 0 which holds due to Condition (2) as
9 5
4
< . Hence, d
AC
A
dB
> 0 holds.
Proof of Proposition 7:
dCBLA
diB
=   1 (1 )B
(1 )(1+iA) < 0 and
dGRA
diB
=  1 (1 )Bp
XGR
GRA < 0. Note that
dCBLAdiB  > dGRAdiB  is
equivalent to 1

>   56 t+p
XGR
which is fullled as 5
6
t + > 0 due to Condition (1).
dACA
diB
=
2( 19  15)[1 (1 )B ]

3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  8[1 (1 )B ]( 98 t )
45(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
+
[1 (1 )B ]( 19  15)
(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC

2
5
  1
9
 (92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 .
With (
92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 = XAC   1 =
 p
XAC   1
  p
XAC + 1

we get
dACA
diB
=
2( 19  15)[1 (1 )B ]

3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  8[1 (1 )B ]( 98 t )
45(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
 2[1 (1 )B ](
1
9
  1
5
)(1+
p
XAC)

p
XAC
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

.
Since 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

= ACA it follows that
dACA
diB
=  2[1 (1 )B ][4(
9
8
t ) (1 )(1+iA)(9 5)ACA ]
45
p
XAC(1 )(1+iA) .
12In order to keep our analysis tractable, we henceforth assume  > 0:6. We think this is justied since in
that case, the foreign bank would not lose more than 40 percent of its screening e¢ ciency due to soft information
problems which seems reasonable.
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Note that 4
 
9
8
t    (1  ) (1 + iA) (9  5) ACA > 0 is equivalent to 98t    9 54 (1 
)(1 + iA)
AC
A > 0 which holds due to Condition (2) as
9 5
4
< . Hence, d
AC
A
diB
< 0 holds.
Proof of Proposition 8:
dCBLA
d 1
t
= 5t
2
4(1 )(1+iA)

2
3
 
q
FCBL
mt

Note, rst, that CBLA < 1 is equivalent to
q
FCBL
mt
< 1
3
+ 2(1 )(1+iA)+2
5t
. Second, as we
abstract from exit of domestic banks it must hold that eCBLB  16 which is equivalent to
5
6
t       (1  ) (1 + iA) A  0. Accordingly, 2(1 )(1+iA)+25t  13 which is equivalent
to 5
6
t     (1  ) (1 + iA)  0 is fullled. Consequently, it must hold that
q
FCBL
mt
< 2
3
.
Hence, it holds that d
CBL
A
d 1
t
> 0.
dGRA
d 1
t
= 5t
2
6
p
XGR
[GRA   15(FGR FCBL)4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA) ]
Note that d
GR
A
d 1
t
> 0 is equivalent to GRA >
15(FGR FCBL)
4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA) . Thus, it holds that
dGRA
d 1
t
> 0 for GRA >
15(FGR FCBL)
4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA) and
dGRA
d 1
t
< 0 for GRA <
15(FGR FCBL)
4m(1 )(1 )(1+iA) .
dACA
d 1
t
=  t
2(1  25)
3
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  t2[  101360 t+ 15( 98 t )  (FGR FAC)m ]
(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
 
t2(1  25)
6(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC

2
5
  1
9
 (92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 .
With (
92 5)[(5t22+36t 162)+ 180tm (FGR FAC)]
(3t(5 2) 2(9 5))2 = XAC   1 =
 p
XAC   1
  p
XAC + 1

we get
dACA
d 1
t
=  t
2(1  25)
3
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC
  t2[  101360 t+ 15( 98 t )  (FGR FAC)m ]
(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
+
t2(1  25)
3
(1+
p
XAC)p
XAC
3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

.
Using 3t(5 2) 2(9 5)
2(92 5)(1 )(1+iA)
 
1 pXAC

= ACA we arrive at
dACA
d 1
t
=
t2[(1 )(1+iA)(5 2)ACA + 56 t+3+ 15m (FGR FAC)]
15(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
.
We now prove that d
AC
A
d 1
t
> 0. d
AC
A
d 1
t
> 0 is equivalent to FAC   FGR < m15 [56t +  + 2 +
(5  2) (1  ) (1 + iA) ACA ]. Note, beforehand, that in case of acquisition entry eACB  12 must
hold due to iB iA > 0, A > B and  = 0. eACB  12 is equivalent to 2+2 (1  ) (1 + iA) A 
0. As the minimum of (5  2) is 3, 2+(5  2) (1  ) (1 + iA) ACA > 0 must then also hold.
As 5
6
t+ > 0 due to Condition (3), it follows that the right hand side of the above inequality
is positive. However, the left hand side of that expression is negative. As a consequence, the
above inequality is fullled and it holds that d
AC
A
d 1
t
> 0.
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Proof of Proposition 9:
dCBLA
dm
=  5t
4m(1 )(1+iA)
q
FCBL
mt
< 0; d
GR
A
dm
=  25t(FGR FCBL)
8m2(1 )(1 )(1+iA)
p
XGR
< 0; d
AC
A
dm
= t(FGR FAC)
m2(1 )(1+iA)
p
XAC
>
0.
Proof of Lemma 4:
(1) No Entry:
Consumer surplus is given by vm+0m (1  ) erBNEm 4m
1
4Z
0
xtdx. Producer surplus is given
by 2NEB = mt 
 
1
2
2
. Rearranging yieldsWNE = m[ (v   iB) (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)  t8 ].13
(2) Cross Border Lending:
Consumer surplus is given by vm+0m (1  ) 
erCBLA eCBLA + 2erCBLB eCBLB m 2m(
1
6Z
0
xtdx+
xCBLA;B1Z
0
xtdx+
xCBLA;B2Z
0
xtdx). Producer surplus is given by 2CBLB . Rearranging yields
WCBL = mfv   t12   13
 erCBLA + 2erCBLB + 1t     12  erCBLB   erCBLA 2+
2[1
3
  1
2t
 erCBLB   erCBLA ][  erCBLB   iB  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)]g.
(3) Greeneld Entry
Consumer surplus is given by vm + 0 m (1  ) 
erGRA eGRA + 2erGRB eGRB m   2m(
1
6Z
0
xtdx+
xGRA;B1Z
0
xtdx+
1
3
 xGRA;B1Z
0
xtdx). Producer surplus is given by 2GRB . Rearranging yields
WGR = mfv   t12   13
 erGRA + 2erGRB + 1t     12  erGRB   erGRA 2 + 2[13   12t  erGRB   erGRA ]
[
 erGRB   iB  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)]g.
(4) Entry via Acquisition
Consumer surplus is given by vm + 0 m (1  )   (erACA eACA + erACB eACB )m   2m(
xACA;BZ
0
xtdx +
1
2
 xACA;BZ
0
xtdx). Producer surplus is given by ACB and the acquisition price amounts to 
GR
B .
Rearranging yields
WAC = mf[v   erACA  12 + 1t  erACB   erACA    12   1t  erACB   erACA  iB] 
13For our analysis to be interesting, we assume WNE > 0.
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 
1
2
  1
t
 erACB   erACA  (1  ) (1  B) (1 + iB)  t2 [14 + 1t2  erACB   erACA 2]+
1
25t
[5
3
t     (1  ) (1 + iA) A]2g.
Proof of Proposition 10:
Shape of Welfare Functions:
dWNE
dA
= 0
dWCBL
dA
jA=0= m(1 )(1+iA)75t2 [5t2 + 12 (3   1) (iB   iA)] > 0
d2WCBL
d2A
=
m(1 )(4 1 32)
t

2(1+iA)
5
2
> 0
dWGR
dA
jA=0= m(1 )(1+iA)75t2 [5t2 + 12 (3   1) (iB   iA)] > 0
d2WGR
d2A
=
m(1 )(4 1 32)
t

2(1+iA)
5
2
> 0
dWAC
dA
jA=0= m(1+iA)(1 )450t2 [15t2 (5  4) + 2 (100 + 18   25) (iB   iA)] > 0
d2WAC
d2A
=
m(182+100 25)
t

(1 )(1+iA)
15
2
> 0
Note that 4   1   32 > 0 as well as 182 + 100   25 > 0 hold for  > 0:5 which we
will assume henceforth. We nd, rst, that WNE is independent of A. Second, WCBL, WGR,
and WAC are quadratic, increasing, and convex functions in A with argmin
A2R
(WCBL) < 0,
argmin
A2R
(WGR) < 0, and argmin
A2R
(WAC) < 0 since the second order conditions with respect to
A are positive and since the rst order conditions with respect to A at A = 0 are positive
as well. Next, we show that WGR > WCBL always holds. WGR  WCBL > 0 is equivalent to
2
25t
mA(1   )(1 + iA)(1   )f56t + 2 (3 1) [ + 12A (1  ) (1 + iA) (1 + )]g > 0 which
is fullled if we assume  > 0.14 Hence, we only need to calculate the intersection points of
WNE, WGR, and WAC .
(a) Intersection between WNE and WGR
Note that WGR  WNE > 0 is equivalent to
1
1800
m
t2
f1442 (3   1) (1  )2 (1 + iA)2 (A)2 + 24 (1  ) (1 + iA) [5t2 + 12(3   1)]A
 5t2[5t (8   3)  24] + 144 (3   1)2g > 0.
Solving for A yields A <
5
12
t

 
p
252 17+3 

 (3 1)
(1 )(3 1)(1+iA) and A >
5
12
t

+
p
252 17+3 

 (3 1)
(1 )(3 1)(1+iA) .
14Regarding the welfare analysis, we only look at host banking markets on a rather low nancial development
stage and assume henceforth = iB iA (1  ) (1 + iB) B > 0. This expression is the more likely fullled the
larger is the di¤erence in renancing conditions of foreign and host country banks and the lower is the screening
ability of host country banks. This limitation seems justied as the entry of foreign banks into nancially very
well developed countries is, in general, not very much regulated.
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Since, as derived above, argmin
A2R
(WGR) < 0, dWNEdA = 0 and
dWGR
dA
jA=0> 0, only one intersection
between WNE and WGR for 0 < A < 1 is possible so that we only need to consider the
intersection point A =
5
12
t
p
252 17+3 

 (3 1)
(1 )(3 1)(1+iA) .
Hence, WGR > WNE is equivalent to A >
5
12
t
p
252 17+3 

 (3 1)
(1 )(3 1)(1+iA)  
GR
W .
(b) Intersection between WGR and WAC
Note that WAC  WGR > 0 is equivalent to
1
1800
m
t2
f4 (1  )2 (1 + iA)2 (100   25 + 362   902) (A)2 4 (1  ) (1 + iA) [(15t2 (6  5)
 2 (100   25 + 36  90))]A + 4 (10 + 11)2   25t22 (2 + 3)  60t2g > 0.
Solving for A yields A < xWAC   5
p
XWAC
2(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)] and
A > x
W
AC +
5
p
XWAC
2(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)]
with xWAC  [
15
2
t(6 5) [25(4 1) 18(5 2)]]
(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)] and
XWAC  t2ft[25 (10 + 172   3) + 18 (6  302   11+ 82)]+
72 (1  ) [5 (4  3) + 6  5]g+ 72 (1  )2 (4   1) (5   2)2.
In principle, two intersections of WAC and WGR for A > 0 are possible. However, remember
that dWGR
dA
jA=0> 0 as well as dWACdA jA=0> 0. Hence, by proong that WGR jA=0> WAC jA=0
we show that we only need to consider the upper intersection point xWAC+
5
p
XWAC
2(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)] .
Note that WGR jA=0  WAC jA=0= m25t
22(2+3) 42(10+11)+60t2
1800t2
. Further, 25t22 (2 + 3) 
42 (10 + 11) > 0 is equivalent to 5
6
t   1
3
q
(10+11)
(2+3)
 > 0. Numerical solutions show
that 0 < 1
3
q
(10+11)
(2+3)
< 1 so that Condition (2) is fullled and, hence, it must hold that
WGR jA=0> WAC jA=0. It follows that WAC > WGR holds for
A > x
W
AC +
5
p
XWAC
2(1 )(1+iA)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)]  
AC
W .
As we can abstract from the lower threshold, it must further hold that dWAC
dA
jA=ACW >
dWGR
dA
jA=ACW .
(c) Intersection of WNE and WAC and proof of 
GR
W < 
AC
W
Note, rst, that it is useful to show that GRW < 
AC
W . 
GR
W < 
AC
W is equivalent to
5
2[25(4 1) 182(5 2)](t
2ft[25 (10 + 172   3) + 18 (6  302   11+ 82)]+
72 (1  ) [5 (4  3) + 6  5]g+ 72 (1  )2 (4   1) (5   2)2) 12 >
1
2(3 1)[25(4 1) 182(5 2)]f  (90+ 100 + 2342   270   722   25)+
[25 (4   1)  182 (5   2)]
p
 17 + 252 + 3]g
[5
6
t +  50(4 1)(3 1)(1 )
[25(4 1) 182(5 2)]
p
 17+252+3 (90+100+2342 270 722 25)
].
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Numerical simulations show that 25 (4   1) 182 (5   2) > 0 so that the left hand side of this
expression is clearly positive. The right hand side is also positive as numerical simulations show
that f  (90+ 100 + 2342   270   722   25)+[25 (4   1) 182 (5   2)]
p
 17 + 252 + 3g
is positive and  1 <  50(4 1)(3 1)(1 )p
 17+252+3(100 902+362 25) (90+100+2342 270 722 25)
< 1 such
that [5
6
t+  50(4 1)(3 1)(1 )p
 17+252+3(100 902+362 25) (90+100+2342 270 722 25)
] > 0 holds accord-
ing to Condition (1). Squaring and rearranging yields
[25 (4   1)  182 (5   2)]f144
5
(3   1) (1  )[ (18 (3   1)  5 (4   1))+
5
p
 17 + 252 + 3 (4   1)][5
6
t   5(4 1)(3 1)(1 )
[18(3 1) 5(4 1)]+5(4 1)
p
 17+252+3
] + t22
[18 ( 10 + 17+ 302   95+ 1302)  25 (4   1) ( 17 + 262 + 3)+
2[25 (4   1) + 18 (13+ 5  15   4)]
p
 17 + 252 + 3]g > 0
Numerical simulations show that [18 (3   1)  5 (4   1)] > 0,
 1 < 5(4 1)(3 1)(1 )
[18(3 1) 5(4 1)]+5(4 1)
p
 17+252+3
< 1 and
[18 ( 10 + 17+ 302   95+ 1302)  25 (4   1) ( 17 + 262 + 3)+
2[25 (4   1)+18 (13+ 5  15   4)]
p
 17 + 252 + 3] > 0 for  > 0:75.15 Hence, the
whole expression is positive since due to Condition (3)
[5
6
t   5(4 1)(3 1)(1 )
[18(3 1) 5(4 1)]+5(4 1)
p
 17+252+3
] > 0.
The above calculations show that GRW < 
AC
W . Remember that we also found that argmin
A2R
(WGR) <
0, dWGR
dA
jA=0> 0, argmin
A2R
(WAC) < 0, dWACdA jA=0> 0, and
dWAC
dA
jA=ACW >
dWGR
dA
jA=ACW . Hence,
we can neglect the intersection point between WNE and WAC , since the policy maker would
always prefer greeneld or acquisition entry to the right hand side of this point.
(d) Entry Mode Pattern Preferred by the Social Planner
It follows from the analysis above that the entry mode pattern the social planner prefers is -
increasing in the screening ability of the foreign bank: no entry - greeneld entry - acquisition
entry. Again, one or both entry modes could drop out of the pattern depending on the parameter
constellations, but the sequence of the pattern can never be di¤erent.
Proof of Proposition 11:
(1) Proof of CBLA < bGRA < GRW
Note that the policy maker cannot require that the foreign bank enters via a de novo investment
if the foreign bank makes losses in case of greeneld entry. Hence, greeneld entry is only
possible for GRA  0 which is equivalent to A  1(1 )(1+iA)

5
2
q
tFGR
m
  5
6
t  

 bGRA .
Note that bGRA > CBLA holds.
15In order to keep our analysis tractable, we henceforth assume  > 0:75.
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(2) Proof of ACW > 
AC
A
Note that ACW > 
AC
A is equivalent to
6
5
[25 (15 + 2  2  5) + 92 ( 25   8  10+ 20)]
[5
6
t   25(1 )(10 1)
(25(15+2 2 5)+92( 25 8 10+20)) ] <
15[25 (4   1)  182 (5   2)]pXAC + 53 (92   5)
p
XWAC .
The right hand side of this expression is positive since 25 (4   1) 182 (5   2) > 0 as shown
before. The left hand side is positive if 25 (15 + 2  2  5)+92 (20  25   8  10) >
0 and 5
6
t   25(1 )(10 1)
25(15+2 2 5)+92(20 25 8 10) > 0. Numerical simulations show that the rst
expression is fullled and that  1 < 30(1 )(10 1)
25(15+2 2 5)+92( 25 8 10+20) < 1 holds, which, in
turn, guarantees that Condition (3) is fullled and, accordingly, 5
6
t 
25(1 )(10 1)
25(15+2 2 5)+92(20 25 8 10) > 0 holds. Squaring both sides and rearranging yields
t22(400+2162 720 1712+100) 12(1 )(27 27 90 70t2+10t+90+135t2 36t)
25(4 1) 182(5 2) <
36t
m
(FGR   FAC) + 90
p
XWAC XAC
25(4 1) 182(5 2) .
The right hand side of this inequality is positive. The left hand side, however, is negative. To
see this, note, rst, that (400 + 2162   720   1712 + 100) < 0. Second, 27  27 
90 70t2+10t+90+135t2 36t > 0 is equivalent to 6
5
(135 + 10  36  70)
5
6
t   15(10 3)(1 )
2(135+10 36 70)

> 0. Note that  1 < 15(10 3)(1 )
2(135+10 36 70) < 1 holds for not too
small (; ) combinations16 ; then, 135+10 36 70 > 0 also holds. Accordingly, Condition
(3) is fullled and it follows that 6
5
(135 + 10  36  70)

5
6
t   15(10 3)(1 )
2(135+10 36 70)

> 0.
As a consequence, the left hand side of the above expression is negative. Hence, the above
expression is true and, consequently, it holds that ACW > 
AC
A .
(3) Proof of d
GR
W
d( 1t )
< 0
dGRW
d( 1t )
=   5t2
12(1 )(3 1)(1+iA)
p
252   17 + 3  

< 0.
16To keep our analysis tractable, we assume  > 53
58 13
140 39 , which is slightly larger than 0.75.
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